Relevance, one of the fundamental notions in information retrieval (IR), has long been studied from a cognitive point of view. It is known that relevance depends not only on the topic of the document and the information need expressed in a query, but also on other 'situational' factors in the retrieval situation, such as the user's previous knowledge, background, intentions and so on. Formal models, on the other hand, usually consider relevance from a system point of view, i.e. they isolate relevance in a restricted context in which only the topic matters. One of the reasons for this very partial modeling is due to the inappropriateness of standard formal tools for describing relevance in a general context. This paper is an attempt to identify a more appropriate logical framework for the modeling. Counterfactual conditional logic is examined with respect to the IR requirements, indicating the logic's high potential value for this task. A particular conditional logic is then defined which, in comparison with previous developments on conditional logic, is better suited to IR. The new model gives an insight into the phenomena related to the 'situational' factors of relevance judgment which, until now, have not been considered.
INTRODUCTION
An information retrieval (IR) system is still widely viewed as a system that selects documents on the basis of matching between document representation and query representation. A document selected by the system is thought of as relevant. This approach to IR and to relevance is commonly called the topical approach [1] in which only the document's and the query's subjects (or representations) matter. Relevance defined in this way is also referred to as system relevance [2] . It has been known for a long time that topicality is not the only criterion of a user's relevance judgment. In [2] , Saracevic states that in the late 1950s there was already ''official recognition that relevance may not be just a simple system phenomenon related to the effectiveness of matching within a retrieval system'' (p. 116). A number of other factors also affect a user's relevance judgments, e.g. the user's previous knowledge of the subject, the expected use of information, time constraints and so on. Various terms have been used to encompass all these factors, such as state of the user [3] , situationality of the user [4] , the problem state [5, 6] and information need situation [7] .
Although we now have many computational models for pical estimation of relevance, there is no suitable model to deal with relevance on its own. Faced with this problem, we have two solutions, as stated by Barry [7] :
One possible solution to the evaluation problem is to accept that information retrieval systems can achieve, at best, high levels of topicality and should be evaluated on that basis alone. Another alternative, one which would advance the field of information science rather than simply admitting present limitations, would be to explore the possibility of incorporating users' relevance criteria into the retrieval mechanism itself. (p. 152) This paper is an attempt to move in the second direction. In order to incorporate 'users' relevance criteria into the retrieval mechanism', we need a proper model capable of describing the way in which the incorporation should be done. It is thus crucial to identify and develop a suitable framework for IR modeling. Unfortunately, the classical tools, such as classical logic, are insufficient in the enlarged modeling context (as will be shown in Section 2). In this paper, we will examine a new type of logic, counterfactual conditional logic (or conditional logic) [8] [9] [10] with respect to our modeling purpose. It will be shown that this logic provides a more suitable basis for relevance modeling. Its application to IR was first proposed in [11] and recently implemented in [12] , but how conditional logic should be applied remained an open question. No satisfactory IR model has ever been defined. Our study follows in the direction pointed out by [11, 13] .
As we will show, although conditional logic provides an interesting framework, its current formulation is not completely adapted for our purpose. Namely, there is no available model allowing the calculation of the probability of a counterfactual in a general case. This calculation is essential for IR due to the uncertainty in 'relevance'. A new model of conditional logic is thus defined.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We will begin by giving our motivation for using conditional logic as a modeling tool (Section 2). In particular, conditional logic will be contrasted with classical logic in the IR case. Then in Section 3, an existing model of conditional logic, the system of spheres, will be described, in order to allow a better understanding of conditional logic. In Section 4, the notion of relevance will be tested against some common properties of counterfactuals in order to provide intuitive indications that relevance should be considered as a counterfactual. In Section 5 and following, we will consider the uncertainty in relevance. In Section 5, we will describe the way in which uncertainty was handled in previous studies on conditional logic. Then a new model, better suited to IR, will be defined in Section 6. We will then consider some particular problems concerning the application of conditional logic to IR (Section 7) and conclude with some final remarks (Section 8).
COUNTERFACTUALS AND IR: PRELIMINARIES
Counterfactual conditional logic (or conditional logic for short) [8] [9] [10] aims at providing a suitable framework for non-monotonic reasoning, e.g. reasoning based on causality.
Given sentences A and B in a given context, the counterfactual conditional A > B, read as ''if A were true, then B would be true'', tries to capture the connection between A and B. In particular, counterfactual conditionals investigate the case in which the antecedent of the conditional is, or is expected to be, false (contradictory to the facts in the given context). It is exactly in the contradictory case that counterfactual conditionals diverge from material conditionals [14] .
The difference between the counterfactual conditional A > B and the material conditional A B may be seen through the following examples:
1. If the bus drivers hadn't gone on strike, I would not have been late. 2. If the bus drivers hadn't gone on strike, Paris would be in Spain.
Suppose the actual context (the context in which the above utterances are made) is that the bus drivers have gone on strike, I was late, my only transportation means was buses, and I did not want to be late. According to the semantics of material conditional, both sentences above are valid (because the antecedent is false under any interpretation corresponding to the context). According to our intuition, however, although the first sentence seems reasonable, the second will certainly be rejected by everyone because there is no connection between the bus drivers' strike and Paris being in Spain. Counterfactual conditionals try to mirror the way people think by admitting the first sentence while rejecting the second. What about the IR case then? Roughly speaking, when a user's query is submitted, the question which arises for the judgment of a given document is the following:
If the information contained in the document were provided to the user in the given retrieval situation, would the query be satisfied? (There will be more discussion later on the notion of 'retrieval situation'. For the moment, let us understand it as encompassing every factor of relevance judgment other than the topic which is supposed to be specified in the query.)
However, the question dealt with in the Boolean model is the following:
Given the information contained in the document, is the query satisfied?
Observe the absence of 'retrieval situation' in this question.
To answer the first question we need an evaluation of the document's relevance with respect not only to the query, but also to the retrieval situation. In the second question the evaluation is situation independent; document relevance is evaluated without considering the particularity of the given retrieval situation (including the particularity of the user and the state of information already available). A document receives the same evaluation for a query in every situation. For example, if a document talking about 'object-oriented database' is judged to be relevant for a computer scientist looking for documents on 'database', then it will be judged in the same way for a computer novice by the Boolean model. Intuitively, the document is not as relevant in the second situation as in the first one.
We can of course enhance the Boolean model with a description of the retrieval situation (by a consistent set of sentences). This means allows us to cope with retrieval situations only to a certain extent. According to the factors that we consider in the retrieval situation, a document content may come into contradiction with the retrieval situation. If this happens, the document will be judged relevant to any query. For example, suppose that the information already available is one of the factors considered in retrieval situations and suppose that no information about 'information retrieval' is already available to the user (i.e. : IR). Then given a document about 'information retrieval' and any query q, the Boolean model relies on the validity of IR q to determine the relevance of the document with respect to that situation. The implication is valid in any model compatible with the situation, and for any q. However, we cannot conclude that the document is relevant to any query (see the coming discussion on the Classical model). Let us give another example. If document content is recognized in a more refined way such that we not only recognize the subjects of the information contained, but also the knowledge described, then the recognized knowledge may also come into conflict with the user's prior knowledge (or beliefs). For example, a user may believe that 'World-Wide Web' has nothing to do with 'information retrieval' before document retrieval. If a document describes exactly that 'World-Wide Web' is strongly related to 'information retrieval', then the knowledge described is in contradiction with the user's prior knowledge. In this case the Boolean model will also judge the document to be relevant to any query. These judgements are clearly counterintuitive. These cases have not attracted much attention in IR because IR modeling has been concentrated within a situation-independent framework. In order to obtain a more complete IR modeling in which retrieval situations are considered in their full scale, the Boolean model becomes inappropriate.
The cases just mentioned are exactly counterfactual cases. Conditional logic aims at providing a more reasonable evaluation of counterfactual conditionals. So, intuitively, conditional logic suggests itself as a more suitable potential framework for considering retrieval situations than does classical logic. We will show this in more detail later. For the moment, it is necessary for us to introduce some basic notions for the present study.
Some basic notions
We first need to specify the 'other factors' of relevance judgment. Many studies have tried to find out all the factors that affect the relevance judgment [2, 3, 5, 6, 15] , but the result seems to vary from case to case. Nevertheless, there does exist general agreement that relevance judgment is at least affected by [16] :
.
The topic of the information the user is looking for.
. The information already available.
. The user's state of knowledge or beliefs about the problem.
. The goals, intentions and background of the user.
The first criterion, the topicality, is usually expressed explicitly as a query. For the sake of simplicity, throughout this paper, we will assume (although this is not always the case in practice) that the query expresses exactly the topic of the user's information need. We will separate it from the other criteria. The term retrieval situation (or situation for short) will be used to encompass all the criteria other than the topic at a given moment for a given user. Retrieval situation is comparable to (yet different from, see below) situation in situation theory [17, 18] where situations are highly structured parts of the world, picked out by a cognitive agent, that the agent can discriminate or individuate. There are two important notions in situation theory, namely real situations and abstract situations:
real situations are the 'parts of the world', picked out by some individuation scheme; abstract situations are mathematical constructs built out of the relations, individuals, and locations of our ontology. [18] (p. 34).
For our study, we make the same distinction: a real retrieval situation is part of the world, other than the topic of the information need, that is concerned with relevance judgment. Included in a retrieval situation are: a particular state of the user's knowledge and of the information available, the user's particular goal, intentions and background, the particular time constraint, and so on. An abstract retrieval situation is a mathematical construct of a real retrieval situation. (From now on, we will only be concerned with abstract retrieval situations unless indicated otherwise.) In such a retrieval situation, everything concerning relevance judgement is assumed to be determined.
Let us define a set of atomic propositions, '' (the word 'relevant' will be implicit from now on). (Note that in Devlin's approach [18] , an abstract situation consists of a set of infons (the basic components of information). Although this approach may be applied to IR [19] , in our present work, we take a more restricted and classical approach: we qualify an abstract retrieval situation in terms of propositions. The restricted approach is chosen in order to be coherent with the classical developments on conditional logic. Note also that the notion of anchor defined here is a bit different from that defined in [18] .) For the sake of simplicity, in our further discussion, we will not distinguish propositions and their anchors explicitly when there is no ambiguity. Thus a document providing information about anchorp is equally described as a document concerning (about) p.
As we can imagine, information described in documents may have quite a complex structure. However, for the sake of simplicity, we will only consider a very simple structure in this paper, the Boolean structure.
With the above definition of propositions, we now can define more precisely the notions of retrieval situation, situation description, document and query.
A retrieval situation (or situation for short) consists of a complete specification of the corresponding real situation. It is assumed that everything concerning relevance judgement, except the information need, is determined in it. Thus, it consists of a maximally consistent set of logical sentences. It can also be called a world in possible-world semantics. (This view of situation is different from that in situation theory [17, 18] . In the latter, a situation corresponds more to our situation description, i.e. it only specifies the known facts instead of requiring that everything is determined. ) However, what is available in practice is merely a partial description of a situation, or a situation description which is an often non-maximally consistent set of sentences. So a problem arises concerning the determination of the retrieval situations corresponding to a situation description. This problem will be discussed in Section 7. Until then, it is assumed that there is already a set of retrieval situations determined. The basic problem will be that of the evaluation of relevance relation with respect to one particular retrieval situation (world). Our choice of working with retrieval situations (or worlds) is due to the previous developments on conditional logic driven within possibleworld semantics.
A document representation (d ) is a description of the information provided by the document. It is expressed as a consistent set of sentences (which is sometimes considered as a logical conjunction too). A query representation (q) is a single logical sentence.
Classical model
Let us re-express the classical-logical approach using the above notions.
A document is represented as a conjunction d of propositions, indicating that there is information about some concepts in that document. A query is represented as a sentence q, expressing the requirement to be satisfied (i.e. some information should become available). A retrieval system is modeled as a classical-logic system together with a (possibly empty) set S of sentences specifying the retrieval situation to some extent.
Given such d, q and S, the estimation of the document's relevance is based on the following deduction:
This expression means: under the assumption (or with the knowledge) S, if it is the case that d (i.e. the information contained in the corresponding document becomes available), then the query q is satisfied. Under this interpretation,
, then the document corresponding to d is judged relevant to the query represented by q.
In most applications, S is assumed to be empty, i.e. S ;
. In this case, q should be a directly deducible from d for the corresponding document to be selected as being relevant. In some 'intelligent' systems, S may contain domain knowledge concerning the application area, such as p i p j , meaning that information about a concept anchor p i is equally information about another anchor p j . In this case, S is intended to represent all the evaluation criteria. However, it cannot. Only part of these factors may be incorporated due to the following assumption which is implicitly made: no document in the application area contains inconsistent information with S. That is, if A
2

S, then :
A is not part of document content d. This assumption confines the Boolean model to be able of considering only domain knowledge which is assumed to be coherent with any document content in that domain. If more user-related factors (e.g. user's prior knowledge, the state of available information) are included in S, we may encounter the contradictory cases shown in the earlier examples. Let us give one more example here. Assume that before retrieving any document, a user believes that a document about 'medicine' provides no information about 'computer science'. This belief may be expressed as
and it is included in S. However, a document may provide information about both 'medicine' and 'computer science', i.e. d p 1^p2
. When considering such a document, we encounter a case in which S q . Thus the document will be systematically judged 'relevant' to any query. This is counterintuitive. Conditional logic is then seen as a more suitable alternative framework to deal with such cases.
IR as counterfactual
Given d and q as before, let S now represent a particular retrieval situation. We roughly describe the evaluation process for the counterfactual conditional d > q relative to S (more details will be given in Section 3). A counterfactual conditional is commonly abbreviated as conditional or counterfactual. We will use all these terms indifferently in our further discussion.
To evaluate d . This is exactly the case where d is independent from, or contradicts, q. Otherwise, we can conclude that there is some relation between d and q. This relation is stronger than the material implication relation d q. The idea underlying the above evaluation is close to belief revision [8] : before judging a counterfactual, the judge has to revise minimally (i.e. in changing as few things as possible) the judging environment in order to verify the antecedent. Then the consequent is evaluated in the revised environment. (This is exactly the idea expressed as the Ramsey test [8] .) Modeled as a counterfactual, document relevance will be understood from a learning point of view:
A document is relevant only if it contains the information such that if it is learnt, the user's information need will be satisfied.
This view of relevance captures the ultimate goal of IR, i.e. to provide relevant information which is to be learnt by the user. From now on, our study will be based on the above understanding of relevance and we will examine how the evaluation principle of conditional logic may be applied to IR. We will begin by examining the theoretical framework of conditional logic which is developed within the possibleworld semantics. Since a retrieval situation (not a situation description) is viewed as a maximally consistent set of sentences, we also call it world from now on.
LEWIS' MODEL FOR COUNTERFACTUALS
In this section, we describe one of the systems of conditional logic, the system of spheres developed by Lewis [9] .
Roughly speaking, a system of spheres is built as follows: from a given (or an actual) world w, some other worlds are accessible but their distance to the actual world may vary. According to this distance, a set of nested spheres around the actual world may be constructed so as to create concentric annular regions, as shown in the following figure. Worlds having the same distance from the actual world are in the same annular region. The larger the annular region, the more distant the worlds in it from the actual world.
In the above figure, the world w is the actual world. The worlds w 1 and w 2 are at equal distances from the actual world w, but they are closer to w than is the world w 3 .
We now give a more formal definition of this system. Let us define a language L 1 as follows.
The alphabet of L 1 is
,^,
. . .
;
p n g , where n is an arbitrary natural number (we are only concerned with finite systems in this paper). The set
ng is the set of atomic sentences standing for atomic propositions (or atoms). The set of well-formedformulae (or sentences) F L 1 of L 1 is defined as follows:
Some more connectives (e.g. (In the case of infinite system of spheres, we also need two more conditions of closure under unions and closure under non-empty intersection. Since the system we are describing is finite, these conditions are satisfied.) 3. V is a valuation function such that for any w To give an example, let us consider the two sentences given earlier:
The actual world is supposed to be as before, i.e. the bus drivers have gone on strike, I was late, and the only transportation means I had was buses and I did not want to be late (and a truth valuation for every other proposition, but this later will not affect the problems under consideration). For the evaluation of the first sentence, given an actual world, there may be a number of alternative worlds around it in which the bus drivers had not gone on strike. For example, there may be the worlds in which the buses travel regularly and the worlds in which the buses are still out of work for some other reasons. However, the nearest alternative worlds are those in which anything other than the bus drivers' strike is not changed (otherwise the worlds would be more distant from the actual world). In any of the nearest alternative worlds, the buses travel regularly as usual, I can then take buses as usual and I will not be late. So in any nearest world in which the bus drivers do not go on strike, I will not be late. Hence, the first sentence is true.
For the second sentence, we have the same nearest worlds as for the first sentence. However, Paris will remain in France despite the hypothesis concerning the bus drivers' strike. So the sentence is false.
At this stage it may be difficult for IR practitioners to imagine a way to obtain such a system of spheres in practice. In fact, any finite system of spheres may also be seen as being determined by a set of ordered constraints
Each sphere then consists of the worlds in which some constraint C i is satisfied. In the smallest sphere f wg, the strongest constraint C 1 is satisfied. In a world in other annular regions, less strong constraints are satisfied. A world w i is nearer to the actual world w than is another world w j iff w i satisfies some constraint C i that w j does not. Thus, any set of ordered constraints induces a definition of distance.
This constraint-based view of systems of spheres is closer to the IR reality: an IR user cannot provide a definition of system of spheres, but can provide an ordered set of constraints which correspond to his/her beliefs or knowledge. For example, a user may believe that 'information retrieval' is part of 'computer science' more strongly than that it is part of 'psychology'. Such user's constraints suffice for the construction of a system of spheres: given any world, a world in which 'information retrieval' is part of 'computer science' but not part of 'psychology' is in a nearer sphere than is a world which verifies the contrary.
On the other hand, from a given system of spheres, we can also determine the corresponding set of ordered constraints implied in that system as follows. For any world w i , let A w i be the conjunction of all the literals (i.e. atoms or negations of atoms) that are true in w i . Then for the nested spheres around w, the smallest sphere A w m ) is true in w j . Notice that constraints are different from situation descriptions: a situation description describes the real world and its correspondence with the worlds in the system of spheres, whereas constraints determine the relationships (distance) among the worlds in the system. Thus constraints are postulates for the system of spheres. More discussion about the determination of a system of spheres will be given in Section 7.
MORE COMPARISON BETWEEN COUNTERFACTUALS AND RELEVANCE
The question still remaining is: how well conditional logic fits IR modeling? The goal of this section is to provide more evidence that relevance in IR can indeed be considered as a counterfactual. As there is no formal definition available for relevance, it is impossible to compare it with counterfactuals on a formal basis. We only can try to compare some formal properties of counterfactuals with the phenomena observed in the study of relevance. In other words, we will try to transfer the properties of counterfactuals to relevance in order to see if the transfer is reasonable. A positive answer would indicate that it is reasonable to consider relevance as a counterfactual. It is easy to verify that these properties are similarly accepted or rejected in the system of spheres. To verify the accepted property, given any world w, suppose that Given any situation (world) w, suppose
i.e. in all the alternative (either near or far) situations, providing information on A always entails B, then if the information on A were provided in the given situation, the query must be satisfied (just in the same way as in the system of spheres). Hence, the document should be judged relevant in that situation, i.e. 
B.
To give a more concrete example, if 'first-order logic' is always a kind of 'logic' in all the alternative situations to w, i.e. w h } ('first-order logic' 'logic'), then providing information about 'first-order logic' at w will lead us to one (or some) of these alternative situations. In this latter, information about 'first-order logic' is available, so is information on 'logic' (according to Modus Ponens). Thus a document on 'first-order logic' should be relevant to a query on 'logic' in that situation (i.e.
w 'first-order logic' > 'logic'). Finally, the connector '>' in this property may be reasonably interpreted as relevance.
triviality:
To give an intuitive rejection of this property in IR, let us imagine a situation (w) in which a user intends to obtain documents about theoretical aspects of 'computer science'. In such a situation a document concerning 'logic' may be relevant to the query on 'computer science', i.e. we have We then have the following (using Modus Ponens):
Applying the accepted property, we then obtain:
The connector '>' in the above expression can no longer be interpreted as relevance in IR: This suggests that triviality should be rejected for relevance.
transitivity:
We also reject this property by providing a counterexample. We can construct a model in IR such that we have the following relevance relations in some situation w: a^b:
(Take, for example, a 'logic' and b 'probability'.) However, a document satisfying (a^b) cannot be relevant to a query asking for (:a^b), i.e. 
(The nearest A-world is a B-world, the nearest B-world is a C-world, but the nearest A-world is not a C-world.)
weakening antecedent:
(The nearest A-world is a B-world, but the nearest A^C-world is not a B-world.)
if the document also describes 'character recognition', then we may know that the document considers 'document analysis' from a point of view less useful for 'information retrieval'. The additional information gives counterevidence to the document's relevance to the query.
We can go further in such intuitive comparison with other common properties of counterfactuals. We will not do this in detail, but only give the following properties that may be imported to relevance:
The above properties, along with the earlier accepted property and the properties of normal modal logic, define a particular conditional logic that Nute calls the weak conditional logic [10] . Nute identifies this logic as forming a 'lower bound' for counterfactuals on which there is common agreement. The intuitive comparison thus suggests that relevance should be somewhere beyond this lower bound and should be considered as a particular counterfactual. Although it is still difficult to determine exactly what particular form of counterfactual relevance should be, it is reasonable to say that conditional logic provides a suitable framework for considering relevance.
UNCERTAINTY OF COUNTERFACTUALS
An important problem of relevance that we have not dealt with until now is its uncertainty. Any reasonable IR model should be capable of estimating the degree of certainty of relevance given a document (representation) and a query (representation) in a situation. One way to measure the degree of certainty of relevance is to define a probabilistic function for it. We would suggest an approach for the estimation of the degree of uncertainty of relevance similar to that for the probability of conditional PA > B. Let us now describe how this latter is evaluated using alternative approaches.
Several attempts have been made to define a probabilistic function PA > B in philosophical logic. The first attempt [20] considered the probability PA > B of a conditional as the conditional probability PBjA:
Unfortunately, this approach fails because it leads to the undesirable triviality [21, 22] .
To bypass this problem, Lewis [21] developed a technique called imaging. Before describing this technique, let us see how the probability of a sentence may be calculated in general.
Until now, we have only considered the evaluation of a counterfactual relative to one particular world in logic. In reality, what is available is merely a partial description of the real world for which a number of worlds in logic may be potential candidates. According to the strength of the correspondence between the real world and the candidate worlds, we may define a probabilistic function P : f 0; 1g
denotes the probability that the real world is in the subset X of worlds. More formally, the probability function P is defined on the Boolean algebra of the power set of the set of worlds, which satisfies the following usual properties:
We will use Pw as an abbreviation of Pfwg.
The problem of definition of the function P is a practical one rather than a theoretical one. However, in order to give an intuition on how this function may be established in IR, let us consider the following particular way of definition. Suppose that there is a situation description which is a non-maximally consistent set of sentences. Every sentence in this description is known to be true in the real world, and has probability 1. With the situation description we can identify a subset of worlds in which the situation description is true. Then the total probability (i.e. 1) is distributed among these worlds. If there are criteria which allow us to determine which worlds are more probable than the others, the probability distribution may be non-uniform. Otherwise, we can make a uniform distribution.
Once the function P is given, the probability of any sentence A is defined according to the following usual formula:
A gives the truth value 2 f 0; 1g of the sentence A in w. Thus, the probability of any sentence A is the summation of the probability of the worlds in which A is true.
This formula may equally be applied to counterfactural
The technique of imaging developed by Lewis [21] is a successful implementation of PA > B which satisfies (1) . Imaging is applied only to a restricted system of spheres in which there is at most one nearest A-world to any world for any sentence A. Let us denote the nearest A-world to w as sA; w 2 W. The imaging process may be described as follows: Given a sentence A and a probability distribution P, the probability Pw of any world w is shifted onto its nearest A-world sA; w, creating a redistribution of probability P A : W ! 0; 1. The redistribution is called imaging on A. If the initial probability distribution P corresponds to our actual beliefs on the worlds, then the new distribution P A corresponds to our revised beliefs in which the antecedent is completely believed (i.e. P A A 1).
Formally, the probability P A after imaging on A is defined as follows: Lewis showed that in the restricted system of spheres, we have:
Thus imaging is a successful technique for the evaluation of probability of conditional. However, as noted by Nute [10] and Gärdenfors [8, 23] , the assumption that every world has at most one nearest A-world for any A is too restrictive. This is equally the case for IR. In many cases we do not have only one nearest world, but rather a set of worlds that are near enough to worth being taken into consideration. For example, to consider there does not appear to be any way to apply the imaging technique to SOS-models [System-Of-Spheresmodels] and thereby provide an account of subjunctive probabilities for that logic by this means. [10] (p. 118)
Gärdenfors' general imaging [8, 23] is very similar to Nute's spreading. As Nute, Gärdenfors does not claim that the general imaging is a tool for the evaluation of conditional in a system of spheres for the same reason. He only applied the technique to knowledge revision.
We agree with Nute in that there is no probabilistic interpretation compatible with the truth evaluation as defined in the system of spheres. However, it is possible to define a generalized imaging for the world structure of the system of spheres while changing the valuation function. The key is to consider counterfactuals to have a status different from classical sentences, so that they may receive non-classical truth values. This distinction is quite natural, as is illustrated by the following sentence.
If the bus drivers hadn't gone on strike, there would be more traffic.
Let the actual world be the same as that given before. Our judgment on this sentence cannot be as absolute as for sentences (1) and (2) given earlier. From the point of view of the actual world, there may be several nearest worlds in which the bus drivers had not gone on strike. However, the consequent of the conditional may receive different evaluations in them: in some of these worlds, there may be more traffic because of the buses; but in some others, there may also be less traffic because many people will take buses instead of using their personal cars. Thus, the consequent is only true in some of the nearest worlds in which the antecedent is true. According to the system of spheres, the sentence is 'false' but we would accept it as being uncertain or true to some degree.
If we accept this distinction between counterfactuals and classical sentences, then imaging may be generalized to the structure of the system of spheres in exactly the same way as in Nute's approach. We will describe this generalization in the following section.
A NEW MODEL FOR COUNTERFACTUALS
Let us define a language L as follows.
The alphabet of L is
;
p n g , where n is an arbitrary natural number. As previously, the set E f
ng is the set of atomic propositions (or atoms). The set of well-formed-formulas (or sentences) F L of L is defined in two steps as follows. First, we define the
The other connectives . This restriction is made for the sake of simplicity, and the defined language is sufficient for our IR modeling purpose. A development of the language without this restriction is given in [24] .
A model for L is a triple In this model, we have the following properties which are easy to verify.
Proposition 1 For any classical sentence A, B and any world w:
One can easily check that none of the rules of transitivity, triviality and weakening antecedent is valid. We also have the following proposition. Given a probability function P over the worlds, and a sentence A, P A is defined as the result of sharing the probability of each world uniformly among all the nearest A-worlds. Proposition 3 Let A be any classical sentence that is not a contradiction, B any classical sentence and P any probability function on the Boolean algebra based on W ; then:
If A is a contradiction, then PA > B is set to 1.
(The definition of the imaged probability may be seen as a special case of both Nute's and Gärdenfors' definitions. In addition, following Gärdenfors' terminology [8] , we can also show that the logic is not conservative (a function P is conservative if PA > B 1 whenever PA > 0 and PB 1). In comparison with Nute's spreading, instead of spreading freely the probability of a world, we only allow the nearest A-worlds (A being the antecedent) to share its probability. This is the key to reach at Proposition 3. However, the sharing may be non-uniform, provided that the sharing is among the nearest A-worlds. In this case, we can still obtain Proposition 3.) Proposition 3 yields that PA > is a probability function. Some implied properties are expressed in the following proposition:
Proposition 4 For any classical sentences A, B:
These properties have adequate interpretation in IR. For instance, the first property means that, if some information is already available, then its relevance is determined by the satisfiability of the query in the same situation, i.e. no imaging is needed. Property 4 means: if two information needs are independent from each other with respect to A, then the satisfiability of any of them by a document on A is the summation of their separate satisfiability. Property 8 and 9 mean: no document can be relevant to a contradictory query (?) and any document may answer an empty query (T).
APPLICATION TO IR
In this section we will consider some problems of applying conditional logic to IR. These problems described are not specific to the application of our model of conditional logic, but common to all models.
On the application of conditional logic to IR there is an interesting study [12] . In this study, an original definition of world is used: a world is identified by an index term. With this definition conventional IR techniques and measures are able to be reused. Although this interpretation of world leads to a concrete way of implementing imaging in IR, it does not consider retrieval situations: relevance estimation is still isolated within a situation-independent framework. It is difficult for us to apply the same approach for our model.
In this section, we will describe our perspective of how imaging may be applied to IR by considering a situation as a world. Let us first summarize the steps for the application of conditional logic to IR: 1. A system of spheres is to be determined first. In particular, the distance among worlds should be partially ordered. 2. A set of situations (or worlds) which correspond to (or are compatible with) the given situation description should be identified and assigned a probability. 3. Finally, Pd > q is evaluated as described in the previous section, i.e. Pd We suppose that there is a finite number of completely independent atoms. Each combination of the atoms' valuation (either 0 or 1) determines a maximally consistent set of sentences, that is a world.
We also assume that the probabilistic function P over the set of the worlds is obtained in the simple way described in the previous section, that is, given a situation description (a non-maximally consistent set of sentences), the total probability (i.e. 1) is uniformly distributed among all the worlds in which the situation description is true. If there are n such worlds, then each world receives probability 1=n.
A naive construction of a system of spheres
Let us begin with a very naive way for this application in which we suppose that there is no information available about the closeness of atoms and worlds. The only criterion that we can use in calculating the distance between two worlds is the number of atoms whose valuations diverge in them.
This is an oversimplified application of conditional logic. To make the above construction clearer, let us consider some simple examples.
Suppose we have three independent atoms: a, b and c. Then we have eight different worlds or retrieval situations as shown in the following figure (where the arcs link the worlds in which only one atom differs):
This structure determines a system of spheres according to the simple way of construction. For example, in the nearest sphere around the world Now we have a system of sphere in which each world is assigned a probability. Given a document on b and a query on c, the probability Pb > c is calculated as follows.
1. The probability of the non b-worlds are shifted to the nearest b-worlds (see Table 1 ): the probability of The above imaging process is the same as that of Lewis because we only have one nearest b-world for each world. Suppose now a new situation described as f b cg and a document as (aVb) (e.g. a document describes 'windows', but we do not know whether it is about 'house windows' (a) or 'computer windows', (b)). Now a query on c is considered. According to the simple probability distribution, Pw is defined as shown in the following b; cg respectively. We have to apply the generalized imaging technique instead so that the probability (1/6) of these two worlds are shared by their nearest (a _ b)-worlds as shown in Table 2 .
So after imaging on (a _ b), the probability distribution is as follows: The above description, although far from realistic, illustrates how the imaging technique may be applied in practice. It also shows the difference between Lewis' imaging and ours. In the following two sections, we will discuss some real IR-related problems.
About the construction of systems of spheres
The notion of distance or closeness between worlds is crucial in any study on conditional logic. In Sections 3 and 6, we indicated that a system of spheres is determined by an ordered set of constraints. This is one way to define distance or closeness. Other definitions have been proposed in previous studies. Most of them are either formula-based or model-based [25] . One of the formula-based approaches defines distance as the result of a syntactic comparison between two sets of formulas, based on the number of the formulas that differ in the two sets (the naive construction in Section 7.1 uses the same principle). One of the modelbased approaches uses set inclusion: a set S 1 is closer to a set S than is a set S 2 if the elements on which S 1 and S differ is a proper subset of the elements on which S 2 and S differ. Our approach is different and is closer to that of [26] , where closeness is defined in terms of pre-orders on the sets of models. This approach is more suitable to IR application because what may be available from a user is a set of (partially) ordered constraints which corresponds to the user's knowledge about the real world. For example, a constraint expressing a physical law is stronger than a constraint concerning a local administration regulation. Constraints provided by a user or extracted from the real world are a bit different from those in Sections 3 and 6. To distinguish them, we call the pieces of constraints extracted from the real worlds individual constraints. Those in Sections 3 and 6 are combinations of individual constraints. Nevertheless, given a set of (partially) ordered individual constraints extracted from real world, we can easily construct a set of ordered constraint combinations as required in Section 3. To give a simple example, suppose that we have the following individual constraints: Suppose that these constraints are separated into three levels in decreasing strength as follows:
Then the following ordered constraint combinations characterize exactly the levels of spheres in the corresponding system:
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We can verify that
1. The probability of a world w after imaging on d is now determined as follows:
where P D j w may be calculated using the imaging technique of Section 6, since D j is a classical sentence.
We can check that the resulting P d w is still a probability distribution. We give a simple example to illustrate the above imaging process. Suppose that there are two propositions concerning the concepts 'information retrieval' and 'computer science'. Let us express them by a and b. With these conditional probabilities and P D j w calculated with earlier imaging technique, we can obtain the new imaged probability P d w according to equation (3) . Then, given a system of spheres and a query representation q as a classical sentence, we can calculate the probability That is, the probability of a conditional with uncertain antecedent is the summation of the probabilities of the compatible classical conditionals along with their compatibility. The probability Pd > q with uncertain d can now be calculated.
CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FURTHER RESEARCH
In this article we have examined the possibility of using conditional logic to model relevance in IR. Intuitive comparisons between conditionals and relevance strongly suggest that relevance has common basic properties with counterfactuals. The evaluation of the latter is then suggested for the estimation of relevance. What underlies this approach is to view relevance from a learning standpoint: a document is relevant if the user's query may be satisfied once the user learns the information provided by the document. We have further developed a new model of conditional logic which is better suited to IR. The model is an extension of existing models in incorporating the idea that counterfactuals have a different status than classical sentences and may receive non-classical truth values. This extension enables us to define a generalized imaging technique for the general world structure of the system of spheres.
In comparison with the classical IR models, the model based on counterfactuals offers several advantages. First, relevance estimation is no longer isolated as a topiccorrespondence relationship. It is placed in a given retrieval situation. Thus we obtain a strongly situation-dependent relevance estimation which copes with relevance in a broader context.
In addition, the idea of considering information retrieval as a learning process strongly corresponds to the new requirements on IR. Modern IR applications are not confined to traditional libraries, allowing users to submit queries and to obtain references. They are more and more used as means of learning [27] . The modeling approach described in this paper provides a more appropriate account of this new context than other IR models.
Finally, conditional logic also offers some new perspectives in IR modeling. For example, it is possible to consider novelty in relevance judgment. These problems have been mentioned by a number of researchers, but no formal consideration has been possible. It is a widely accepted concept that a document is relevant only if it provides new information useful for the query. A simple way to capture novelty is to define a new estimate of relevance based on conditional logic as follows: Although we have defined a model in this paper, it is to be noted that the model only describes a general framework within which IR may be considered. We did not (intend to) deal with the problems of how different criteria of relevance judgment should be incorporated. For this, we first have to find out more exactly the relationship between these criteria and relevance through cognitive studies. However, this is not to say that formal modeling of relevance should wait until all the relationships have become clear. It is our belief that there is a strong connection between cognitive understanding and formal modeling of relevance. On one hand, a more profound understanding enables a more accurate formal modeling. On the other, formal modeling which aims to express our cognitive understanding in a formal framework enables us to study relevance on a formal basis, allowing us, for example, to detect inconsistencies in our observations and our misunderstanding of relevance. From this point of view, formal modeling of the still-empirical notion of relevance is highly helpful. It is in this spirit that we carried out this study.
